Monthly Archives: November 2015

Dridex Black Friday

Last October different law enforcement agencies orchestrated a takedown of the Dridex Botnet. However, the threat actors behind Dridex spam runs seem stronger than ever. The resurrection of Dridex after the announced take down has been ferocious. During the last Black Friday in our spam traps we observed at least four different phishing campaigns delivering Dridex. Each campaign was carefully crafted in order to lure the users to open the malicious documents. The creativity of the threat actors is captivating. The below picture illustrates one of these emails that is supposedly sent from the well-known rent-a-car company AVIS. The email contains a Microsoft Office document attached that contains malicious macros on it.


Another one was an email supposedly sent from Bruce Sharpe from the Industrial Pump Supplier Aline Pumps in Australia. According to the social network zoominfo Bruce Sharpe exists and is an account manager in the company. The subject was Tax Invoice and once again the email contained a Microsoft Office document attached with malicious macros.Other one was an email sent from Ivan Jarman from SportSafe UK. The company is a global provider of sports equipment. This time the subject was Invoice and the email contained a Microsoft Office document attached with malicious macros. The last one was an email from the company Integrated Petroleum Services. According to the website one key location is Equatorial Guinea and the emails supposedly come from there. The subject this time was Transfer and the email contained a Microsoft Office document attached with malicious macros. As bonus the footer will mention the email has been scanned by the Antivirus AVAST. All documents use the same technique. Attract the user to enable macros in order to view the document contents.


Across all the campaigns the technique is the same. All the Microsoft Office documents contain embedded macros that download a malicious executable from one of many hard coded URLs. These hard coded URLs are normally collateral victims of the operation. The encoding and obfuscation techniques used in the macros are constantly changing in order to bypass security controls.

Normally these URLs are hosted under legitimate sites that have been compromised to host the malicious file. When the macro is executed it will fetch a second stage payload from the compromised server. This payload is then saved to C:\Users\%%username\AppData\Local\Temp and then executed.

After the machine gets infected Dridex will start beaconing out to the C2 addresses. Dridex uses HTTP to encapsulate the traffic and encrypts the payload. Below an example how the first HTTP POST request made by the infected machine looks like in the network. A POST to the root folder full of gibberish.


From this moment onward the malware is capable of stealing all kinds of credentials from the victim’s computer. It can also redirect victim’s traffic to sites controlled by the threat actors using man-in-the-browser functionality. This allows interception and manipulation of traffic that is supposed to be delivered to legitimate sites. Dridex has remote access functionality that allows the threat actor to connect to websites trough the victim computer.

Phishing campaigns that distribute commodity malware are common and ongoing problem for end users and corporations.E-mail continues to be the weapon of choice   for mass delivering malware. The tools and techniques used by attackers  continue to evolve and bypass all the security controls in place. From a defense perspective, the US-CERT put together excellent tips for detecting and preventing this type of malware and to avoid scams and phishing attempts applicable to home users and corporations.

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Digital Forensics – SuperTimeline & Event Logs – Part I

In these series of articles about performing file system forensics on a Windows system we covered the evidence acquisition in the first article. The second article was about processing the evidence and creating a timeline of the NTFS metadata. The one below will be split in two parts and will cover the analysis of a Super Timeline and the different artifacts. The main focus will be on parsing and analyzing Windows Event Logs.

In this article we will not cover the creation of the super timeline because has been covered already in this article using Plaso engine. We will move on directly to the analysis and artifacts.

For contextualization  Plaso is a Python-based rewrite of the Perl-based log2timeline initially created by Kristinn Gudjonsson and enhanced by others. The creation of a super timeline is an easy process and it applies to different Microsoft Windows operating systems. However, the interpretation is hard. The Plaso engine is able to parse different type of artifacts such as Windows Event Logs, Windows Registry, Windows Prefetch files and many others. During the analysis it helps to be meticulous, patience and it facilitates if you have comprehensive file systems, operating system artifacts and registry knowledge.

One thing that facilitates the analysis of a Super Timeline is to have some kind of lead about when the event did happen. Then you start to reduce the time frame of Super Timeline and narrowing it down. Essentially we will be looking for artifacts of interest that have a temporal proximity with the event.  The goal is to be able to recreate what happen based on the different artifacts.

A good starting point is looking at the different Windows Event Logs that were recorded in the Super Timeline. But before we dig into our Super Timeline and the WinETX artifacts let’s review some concepts about the Windows Event Logs.

The Windows Event Logs are a good source of information when looking for potential attacks or misuse of the system. The Windows Event Logs include all the records that are a result of the enforced auditing policy i.e., the amount of information is dependent on the Audit Policy settings. For example on a standalone Windows 7 default installation the Audit Policies state that there is no auditing. This can been seen in the local group policy settings as you could see in the below image.


However, there is some auditing enable and you could verify it using the command line auditpol.exe tool. The below picture shows the auditpol.exe output in the same Windows installation from where the group policy stated that there was no auditing enable. This inconsistency is describe by Microsoft here.


From Windows Vista onwards the Windows Event Logs are stored in the  %SystemRoot%\System32\Winevt\Logs folder and contain a .EVTX extension. This new format called Windows XML Event Log (EVTX) format super seeds the EVT format used in Windows XP. Apart of Event Logs from Vista onward there are Application and Service logs that record events about a particular component or application rather then system. On a Windows 7/2008 System many event log files can be found depending on the roles performed by the system. In here you can even find application event logs. For example if the system has Symantec Endpoint you will have a “Symantec Endpoint Protection Client.evtx” file.  The different categories are described here. Nonetheless, there are three important files. The description was taken from Microsoft Technet website.

Application.evtx – “The Application log contains events logged by applications or programs. For example, a database program might record a file error in the application log. Program developers decide which events to log.”

System.evtx – “The Security log contains events such as valid and invalid logon attempts, as well as events related to resource use, such as creating, opening, or deleting files or other objects. Administrators can specify what events are recorded in the security log. For example, if you have enabled logon auditing, attempts to log on to the system are recorded in the security log.”

Security.evtx – “The System log contains events logged by Windows system components. For example, the failure of a driver or other system component to load during startup is recorded in the system log. The event types logged by system components are predetermined by Windows.”

To be able to parse and read these files there are good open source tools available. The work pioneered by Andreas Schuster in 2007  and afterwards by Joachim Metz on Libevtx were key to develop this capability.

One tool is the Plaso engine but that we already covered in another post. Another is the Python-evtx created by Willi Ballenthin. This tool written in Python has the ability to read the EVTX format. The tool is available on Github and contains different modules. One is the that allows us to dump the contests of the Event Log files. The following picture shows the installation and a simple usage of this tool in the SIFT workstation.


Other than using open source tools you can also use Windows Event Log Parser from TZworks. Or you can use the native Microsoft tools. For example using the Windows GUI and use Event Viewer or you could use Windows CLI and use wevtutil.exe. Another option is the versatile  Microsoft Log Parser.

The below pictures illustrates an example where we map a network drive to point to our evidence that is mounted on the SIFT workstation. Then we use wevutil.exe to query the Event Logs. First example with no filter and second example with a XML filter that was created using the Windows Event Viewer.


Please note that in this exercise the Security.evtx contains logon events because the system is not part of a Active Directory Domain. If that was the case the logon events will be recorded on the Domain Controllers.

Now, that we briefly covered the Windows Event Logs let’s review Audit Policy Settings. This is important because will allow us to to know what to expect on the Event Logs. The Audit Policy Settings control which events will be recorded on the Event Logs.

To be able to read the Audit Policy settings we need to read a special Registry key.  At the time of this writing I could not find an open source tool that allowed us to retrieve these settings from a forensic image. The Audit Policy settings are stored in the registry under the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Security\Policy\PolAdtEv key. RegRipper is able to parse and output the contents of this key on Windows XP but seems to have issues on Windows 7 as you could on the below image. Nonetheless, it can retrieve the contents of the key. By having the contents of the registry key we can use the paper created by Teru Yamazaki that describes the structure of this key on newer Microsoft operating systems. With the information we can understand which audit settings are defined. The below image illustrates a manual mapping between the different events and the possible settings.


Teru Yamazaki also has an online tool on his website that allows you to parse this information automatically. You can get the audit policy from the SECURITY registry file using RegRipper and paste the contents into his tool. The output will be in Japanese but you can use Google Translator. In this exercise as seen by the Audit Policy settings we have Success and Failure turned on for all the event types.

Now that we know which kind of auditing settings we can expect and we reviewed some of the tools we could use to read the Event Logs we can start analyzing our Super Timeline and WinEVTX artifacts. This will be done on part II.

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Digital Forensics – Evidence Acquisition and EWF Mounting

[This is my first post on a series of articles that I would like to cover different tools and techniques to perform file system forensics of a Windows system. First article is about acquiring a disk image in Expert Witness Format and then mounting it using the SIFT workstation. LR]

Let’s look at an hands-on scenario to create a forensic image from a compromised system. To acquire the disk we will boot the system from a CD/USB using Helix and then run ewfacquire. Ewfacquire is a tool that allows us to acquire media and stored it in Expert Witness Format. Essentially, it can acquire media in an equivalent format that commercial tools like EnCase and FTK imager do. EWF format is very popular due to the market penetration of Guidance Software and their Encase Suite. The EWF format also know as Encase evidence files (E01) are a representation of the acquired physical or logical drive. Plus they support metadata, the evidence hash value, compression and file splitting. These features are very convenient.

Ewfacquire is simple and flexible tool that is part of the LibEWF package that contains many other great forensic tools written by Joachim Metz. It is launched using the command line and is preinstalled in Linux distributions like Helix and SIFT Workstation. In this case we will run use Helix. Helix product went commercial but you can still download the free 2009R3 version.

Frist step is boot the compromised system with a CD/USB using Helix. Then we will plug the pristine media where we will store the evidence and mount it. Following that we launch ewfaquire.  On a previous post I wrote about the first two steps.

In this exercise we will concentrate on ewfaquire. We can see the source and destination devices by running fdisk -lu. Then we know which drive will be the source and the destination. In this case the source drive is /dev/sda. We then start the acquiring process by launching the ewfacquire tool  with source drive as option and a set of questions will be raised. Below picture ilustrate this steps. The values are self explanatory. In this case we are aquiring a physical disk using the best compression method in EWF format.  After entering the default values which are good enough for the majority of the case were are asked to review the settings and then proceed. The process will take some time depending on factors like disk size and compression method. When finish the evidence hash value is presented. All this information is stored in the metadata and can be reviewed afterwards with ewfinfo.


After the acquire process is finish we will have a bunch of .E## files in our target media. Next step is to move them to our SIFT workstation and process the image.

This will take three steps. First we mount the EWF files using, then we get the partition layout using mmls and finally we run the mount command. is a script written in Python by David Loveall and available in SIFT workstation that allows us to read the evidence in EWF format and prepare it in a way that can be mounted. Then we use mmls from thesleuthkit written by Brian Carrier to display the partition layout of the physical disk we acquire. With mmls we find the starting sector for each one of the NTFS partitions and we use that value in the mount command. Finally, we use the mount command for each partition we want to mount.

In the mount command we have different flags. The loop suffix allows us to mount disk images. The ro is to ensure we mount the evidence in read only. The show_sys_files is important if we want to see the NTFS metadata. Then the stream_interface=windows is used in order to be able to read data streams such ADS. Finally, the offset is calculated by multiplying the starting sector with the amount of units we have per sector (a.ka. bytes per cluster). The following image illustrate these steps.


After mounting the different partitions into /mnt/windows folder we can see their contents. Because we mount it with the show_sys_files option. we can see the different NTFS metadata files that start with $.


That’s it! The techniques and tools are not new. However, the tools are open source and the techniques are relevant and used in today’s digital forensic analysis. Next step, produce a forensic timeline!

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